

Supporting Information Appendix

Inequality and Redistribution Behavior in a Give-or-Take Game

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Materials and Methods

IRB Approval and Informed Consent

The study was approved by the Internal Review Board at Washington University in St. Louis (IRB ID # 201607129) after a full review that also included a cultural review. The IRB at Stanford University reviewed the research protocol and determined that the study qualifies for exempt review (eProtocol # 38517).

The informed consent text which respondents saw on the first page of the online survey before indicating whether they would like to participate or not read as follows:

“We invite you to participate in a research study being conducted by investigators from Washington University in St. Louis, Stanford University and the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland. The purpose of the study is to examine people’s thoughts about contemporary political and economic issues.

If you agree to participate, we would like you to complete a short survey about your public policy views. The survey should take no longer than 15 minutes. Approximately 15,000 people will take part in this study. There are no known risks from being in this study, and you will not benefit personally. However we hope that others may benefit in the future from what we learn as a result of this study. You will not have any costs for being in this research study.

All participants who complete the survey will receive Mingle points per Respondi’s policies and will be automatically entered into five prize drawings for an Amazon gift card of \$100. The winners will be informed by Respondi.

Your responses will be anonymous - you will not be individually identified and your responses will be used for statistical purposes only. Washington University will only receive de-identified survey responses with no information about you. However, federal regulatory agencies and Washington University, including the Washington University Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves research studies) and the Human Research Protection Office may inspect and copy records pertaining to this research. If we write a report about this study we will do so in such a way that you cannot be identified.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. Any data that was collected as part of this study will remain as part of the study records and cannot be removed. If you decide to participate in the study you may stop participating at any time by closing out of your browser. You will not be penalized or lose any benefits for which you otherwise qualify.

We encourage you to ask questions. If you have any questions about or feel harmed from being in the study, please contact: Michael Bechtel at michael.becht@unig.ch. If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Human Research Protection Office at 660 South Euclid Avenue, Campus Box 8089, St. Louis, MO 63110, 1-

(800)-438-0445 or email hrpo@wustl.edu. General information about being a research participant can be found on the Human Research Protection Office web site, <http://hrpo.wustl.edu>]. To offer input about your experiences as a research participant or to speak to someone other than the research staff, call the Human Research Protection Office at the number above.”

Survey Programming and Sample

We programmed and hosted the survey in Qualtrics. The online sample was provided by Respondi. Respondi maintains own, actively managed online-panels that employ a combination of online and offline recruitment methods to ensure that the panels can be used for conducting representative surveys (1). We provided Respondi with margins for socio-demographics (age, gender, education) derived from population censuses to ensure that our samples match the population margins in the United States and Germany. To remove any remaining imbalances we weighted the data using the ebalance-algorithm (2). Table S1 provides information about the distribution of socio-demographic characteristics in the raw sample, the weighted sample, and the voter population. Unless indicated otherwise, all analyses use weighted data.

Give-or-Take Game and Redistribution Behavior in the Strategy Method

The survey contained two parts to elicit individuals' aversion to advantageous (a) and disadvantageous (d) inequality. The first part was the payoff-relevant “give or take” game which was explicitly payoff-relevant. We provided respondents with the game instructions (see Figure S1 for an example). The game was based on the option of winning one of two Amazon gift cards. The initial values of these gift cards could vary. We informed respondents about the initial value of their gift card that he/she could win and the other winner's gift card. We randomized these initial values (\$ in the United States and € in Germany) to be (respondent/other winner): (25/75), (50/50), or (75/25) and informed respondents that they could increase or decrease these values by choosing to give to or take from the other winner. If a respondent chose to give, the amount would be deducted from his/her initial gift card value and added to the other winner's gift card. If a respondent decided to take, the amount would be deducted from the other winner's gift card and added to his/her own gift card. We illustrated these two options with an example. The experiment randomized the order in which the two options were displayed.

On the screen that followed, respondents were again shown the initial gift card values and asked whether they wanted to give, take or do nothing (see Figure S2). We randomized the order of the answer options “give” and “take”. Respondents could use a slider to give any amount up to all of their entire initial endowment to the other winner (if they decided to give) or take any amount up to the entire initial endowment of the other winner (if they decided to take). Respondents were shown in real time the final values of both gift cards depending on the current slider position (see Figure S3). Individuals could redistribute any amount as long as the resulting value of the two vouchers was zero or positive.

The second part relied on the strategy method to elicit respondents' redistribution schedules. We did not inform respondents that this part of the survey was no longer payoff-relevant. The exact question wording for the first question was:

“Now, suppose that the initial value of your gift card was the same but the initial value of the other winner's gift card was different. Please indicate how much you would like to either take from or give to the other winner if the initial value of the gift cards is as follows:

You: \$75

Other: \$5”

We repeated this question (using a slightly shorter version) with the initial value of the respondent’s gift card remaining constant while the other winner’s initial gift card took on each of the following initial values: 15, 25, 50, 75, 85, and 95 \$/€. Respondents were not asked again how much they would redistribute if the other winner’s initial gift card value was equal to the initial value in the first part of the give-or-take game. Below each question was a slider that ranged from the maximum amount a respondent could take to the maximum amount a person could give. The resulting final values of the gift cards were shown in real time depending on the slider position. This provides us with a redistribution schedule for each respondent that says how much a person redistributes conditional on the direction and level of inequality.

Coding of Types

We estimate each respondent’s sensitivity to a- and d-inequality using their conditional redistribution behavior in combination with individual-level auxiliary regressions. The dependent variable is *Given* which measures the amount given (positive values) or taken in each of the proposed scenarios. Our independent variables are: ΔPoorer , which is the difference between the other respondent’s initial gift card value and the respondent’s own initial gift card value. The second independent variable is ΔRicher . This variable equals the difference between one’s own initial gift card value and the gift card value of other respondent.

To derive individual-level sensitivities to a- and d-inequality, we estimate two auxiliary regressions for each respondent. To estimate d-sensitivity (the elasticity of redistribution behavior to disadvantageous inequality) we regress for each respondent the amount given on ΔPoorer using all observations for which $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ and multiply the estimated coefficient by -1. To estimate a-sensitivity (the elasticity of redistribution behavior to advantageous inequality), we regress for each respondent the amount given on ΔRicher using all observations for which $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$.

We use the estimated coefficients (d-sensitivity and a-sensitivity) to classify individuals’ redistribution types. We use the following coding rule where “sensitivity” refers to the estimated coefficient:

- Equalizer: $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$
- Non-Equalizer: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$
- Other: All remaining cases.

Robustness of Classification

To assess the sensitivity of our results to these coding rules, we develop an alternative coding scheme that changes the intervals that identify Equalizers and Non-Equalizers:

- Equalizer_{Alt}: $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$
- Non-Equalizer_{Alt}: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$
- Other_{Alt}: All remaining cases.

Fig. S1.

Screenshot of Give-or-Take Game: Instructions. This picture shows the screen that respondents saw as introduction text to the give-or-take game. In the example, the initial value of the respondent's gift card is \$75 and that of the other person \$25. The experiment randomized the order in which the options "Give" and "Take" were displayed and the amount given/taken in the examples was always \$15.

We will raffle two Amazon gift cards among all respondents that have completed the survey. Just like people's wealth in the real world, the values of these gift cards may vary.

Suppose you are one of the winners and the initial value of your gift card is \$75 and the initial value of the other winner's gift card is \$25. You will have the possibility to increase or decrease the value of both gift cards:

Option "Give": You can give any amount from your gift card to the other winner. Any amount given to the other will be deducted from your gift card and then added to the gift card of the other winner.

- For example, if you decide to give \$15, you will receive \$60, and the other person will receive \$40.

Option "Take": You can take any amount from the other winner's gift card to increase the value of your gift card. Any amount taken from the other will be deducted from the gift card of the other winner and added to your gift card.

- For example, if you decide to take \$15, you will receive \$90, and the other person will receive \$10.

Fig. S2.

Screenshot of Give-or-Take Game: Decision Whether to Take or Give. This picture shows the screen that respondents saw when they were asked whether they wanted to take, give, or do nothing. In the example, the initial value of the respondent's gift card is \$75 and that of the other person \$25. The experiment randomized the order in which the options "Take" and "Give" were displayed but always showed "Do nothing" as last option.

The initial value of your gift card is: \$75

The initial value of the other person's gift card is: \$25

Do you want to take something from the other person, give something to the other person, or do nothing?

- Take
- Give
- Do nothing


Fig. S3

Screenshot of Give-or-Take Game: Giving in the \$75/\$25-Condition. The picture shows the screen respondents saw that chose to give in the 75\$ own/25\$ other condition. Respondents could use the slider to indicate the amount they wanted to give to the other person. The final values of the gift cards were updated in real time as a function of the slider position and were displayed to respondents below the slider. The range of the slider in the experiment varied and was chosen so that each respondent could take or give (depending on the choice made in the question displayed in Figure S2) the maximum amount possible depending on the initial values of the gift cards. The custom start position of the slider was set to 0 and individuals that chose to do nothing in the previous screen skipped this part.

The initial value of your gift card is: \$75
The initial value of the other person's gift card is: \$25

How much do you want to give?

(Please note that even if you do not want to move the slider, you have to touch it to proceed to the next question.)



The final value of your gift card is: \$56

The final value of the other person's gift card is: \$44

Fig. S4

Distribution of Individuals' Redistribution Schedules in the Give-or-Take Game. The plot shows the share taken/given conditional on the type and level of inequality between the two players in the give-or-take game by level of respondents' own initial endowments. The share taken is the amount taken divided by the other respondent's endowment, which is the maximum possible amount that could be taken. The share given is the amount given divided by the respondent's own initial endowment which is the maximum possible amount that could be given to the other. Darker lines indicate higher frequency. The redistribution schedules are elicited using the strategy method (see Materials and Methods for details).




Table S1.

Distributions of Socio-demographics in the Survey Sample and the Population. The table shows the distributions of socio-demographics in the population, the weighted sample, and the raw sample. The population socio-demographics are taken from the following sources: United States: 2016 Current Population Survey. Germany: German Statistical Office, 2011 Population Census and data on education was obtained from the German statistical office for the year 2010.

	Population (%)	Weighted Sample (%)	Raw Sample (%)
United States (N=2,749)			
Age: 18-24	12.30%	12.34%	14.26%
Age: 25-44	32.50%	32.54%	34.99%
Age: 45-64	34.70%	34.67%	33.32%
Age: 65+	20.50%	20.45%	17.42%
Gender: Male	48.20%	48.22%	48.96%
Gender: Female	51.80%	51.78%	51.04%
Education: Less than high school degree	9.50%	9.46%	6.88%
Education: High school degree	29.20%	29.26%	32.96%
Education: Some college	30.00%	30.08%	34.78%
Education: Bachelor's degree	20.00%	19.92%	14.44%
Education: Advanced degree	11.20%	11.29%	10.95%
Germany (N=2,217)			
Age: 18-24	8.60%	8.59%	7.67%
Age: 25-44	27.50%	27.51%	29.27%
Age: 45-64	37.00%	37.00%	36.18%
Age: 65+	26.90%	26.90%	26.88%
Gender: Male	48.40%	48.43%	51.20%
Gender: Female	51.60%	51.57%	48.80%
Education: High school lowest tier	43.80%	43.62%	28.06%
Education: High school medium tier	25.70%	25.98%	44.79%
Education: High school high tier	14.50%	14.45%	12.00%
Education: University/College	16.10%	15.95%	15.16%

Table S2.

Measurement and Coding of Variables. This table describes the variables and variable codings.

<i>Amount Taken</i>	Amount taken in the give-or-take game (in \$/€) explained in the Section “Materials and Methods”. Amounts taken are positive, amounts given negative.
<i>Government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich.</i>	Based on the question “To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements:” The exact wording of the item was “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich.” We measured respondents’ attitudes towards this statement on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We randomized the polarity of the answer scale and adapted the initial part of the question text accordingly.
<i>Government should not spend less on benefits for the poor.</i>	Based on the question “To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements:” The exact wording of the item was “The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.” We measured respondents’ attitudes towards this statement on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and recoded the answers to invert the item and the answer scale. We randomized the polarity of the answer scale and adapted the initial part of the question text accordingly.
<i>Male</i>	Self-reported gender. Recoded into binary variable where 1 equals male and 0 female.
<i>Age</i>	Self-reported age. Recoded into the categories 18-29, 30-49, 50-69, and 70+.
<i>Income</i>	Self-reported household income. Recoded into income: low (income in the lowest quartile), income: middle (interquartile range), and income: high (income in the upper quartile) with unweighted data.
<i>Education</i>	Self-reported highest level of education. US respondents were coded into the following categories: low: up to and including high school degree or equivalent, middle: Some college (1-4 years, no degree) and associate’s degree (including occupational degree), high: Bachelor’s degree and advanced degrees. German respondents were coded into the following categories: low: up to and including secondary school leaving certificate (Haupt-(Volks-)schulabschluss), middle: polytechnic secondary school of the former GDR (Abschluss polytechnische Oberschule der DDR), intermediate secondary school or similar degree (Realschul- oder gleichwertiger Abschluss), university of applied sciences entrance qualification (Fachhochschulreife), higher education entrance qualification (Abitur), and vocational education (Berufsausbildung), high: university of applied science degree (Fachhochschulabschluss) and university degree.
<i>Ideology</i>	Self-reported placement on left-right-scale (0-10). The question wording was: “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” Recoded into the categories left (0-2), center (3-7), and right (8-10).
<i>Employment status</i>	Self-reported employment status. The question wording was: “Which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last seven days)?” Answer categories included for the United States: “In paid work or away temporarily (employee, self-employed, working for your family business)”, “In education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation”, “Unemployed and actively looking for a job”, “Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job”, “Permanently sick or disabled”, “Retired”, “In community service”, “In military service”, “Doing housework, looking after children or other persons”, “Don’t know”, and “None of these”. Answer categories for Germany: "Paid Work", "Doing Apprenticeship", "Unemployed and actively looking for job", "Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for job", "Mini- and Midi-Job", "Unemployed at the moment", "Short-time work at the moment", "Retired", "Housework", "Military, community service, voluntary social year", "In school", "Studying", "Not able to work", "Don't know", "No Answer". Recoded into employed, unemployed, retired, in education, and other.

Table S3.

The Causal Effect of Inequality: Amounts Taken in the Give-or-Take Game. This table reports linear regressions of amounts taken on the initial type of inequality for the pooled dataset (model 1), the United States (model 2), and Germany (model 3) using survey weights. Amounts taken are measured by individual's amount taken in the give-or-take game (positive: taken, negative: given). The initial type of inequality is coded as follows (respondent's initial gift card value in \$/€ / other's initial gift card value in \$/€): (25/75): Disadvantageous Inequality, (50/50): Equality, (75/25) Advantageous Inequality. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1) Pooled	(2) United States	(3) Germany
<i>Disadvantageous Inequality</i>	9.80*** (0.53)	9.79*** (0.74)	9.81*** (0.75)
<i>Equality</i>	0.80* (0.43)	1.27* (0.68)	0.22 (0.47)
<i>Advantageous Inequality</i>	-9.15*** (0.44)	-9.00*** (0.62)	-9.33*** (0.61)
<i>Observations</i>	4,966	2,749	2,217
<i>R-squared</i>	0.150	0.126	0.198

Table S4.

Amounts Taken in the Give-or-Take Game: Unweighted Results. This table reports linear regressions of amounts taken on the initial type of inequality for the pooled dataset (model 1), the United States (model 2), and Germany (model 3) without survey weights. Amounts taken are measured by individual's amount taken in the give-or-take game (positive: taken, negative: given). The initial type of inequality is coded as follows (respondent's initial gift card value in \$/€ / other's initial gift card value in \$/€): (25/75): Disadvantageous Inequality, (50/50): Equality, (75/25) Advantageous Inequality. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (***) $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$).

	(1) Pooled	(2) United States	(3) Germany
<i>Disadvantageous Inequality</i>	9.95*** (0.52)	10.00*** (0.75)	9.90*** (0.69)
<i>Equality</i>	0.87** (0.42)	1.25* (0.67)	0.40 (0.48)
<i>Advantageous Inequality</i>	-9.22*** (0.43)	-9.08*** (0.62)	-9.41*** (0.57)
<i>Observations</i>	4,966	2,749	2,217
<i>R-squared</i>	0.152	0.128	0.198

Table S5.

Frequency of Redistribution Types. This table reports the distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) separately for the pooled dataset (second column), the United States (third column), and Germany (fourth column). Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N(total)=4,966. N(United States)=2,749, N(Germany)=2,217.

D-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	46.93%	39.79%	55.79%
Non-Equalizer	29.43%	35.04%	22.47%
Other	23.63%	25.16%	21.74%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

A-Redistribution Types	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	47.48%	42.60%	53.54%
Non-Equalizer	39.23%	43.06%	34.48%
Other	13.29%	14.34%	11.98%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table S6.

Frequency of Redistribution Types, Unweighted. This table reports the distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) separately for the pooled dataset (second column), the United States (third column), and Germany (fourth column). Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. $N(\text{total})=4,966$. $N(\text{United States})=2,749$, $N(\text{Germany})=2,217$.

D-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	47.08%	39.83%	56.07%
Non-Equalizer	29.42%	34.96%	22.55%
Other	23.50%	25.21%	21.38%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

A-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	47.58%	42.74%	53.59%
Non-Equalizer	39.05%	42.78%	34.42%
Other	13.37%	14.48%	12.00%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table S7.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for the pooled dataset. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=4,966.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	30.38%	13.50%	3.06%	46.93%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	10.25%	16.93%	2.26%	29.43%
	<i>Other</i>	6.86%	8.81%	7.97%	23.63%
	<i>Total</i>	47.48%	39.23%	13.29%	100.00%

Table S8.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample, Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for the pooled dataset. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=4,966.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	30.31%	13.49%	3.28%	47.08%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	10.33%	16.87%	2.22%	29.42%
	<i>Other</i>	6.95%	8.68%	7.87%	23.50%
<i>Total</i>		47.58%	39.05%	13.37%	100.00%

Table S9.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the United States. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for the United States. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,749.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	24.55%	12.58%	2.67%	39.79%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	11.40%	21.10%	2.54%	35.04%
	<i>Other</i>	6.64%	9.38%	9.13%	25.16%
<i>Total</i>		42.60%	43.06%	14.34%	100.00%

Table S10.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the United States Unweighted.

This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for the United States. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-0.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < 0.25$: Non-Equalizer, $0.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < 0.75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,749.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	24.41%	12.59%	2.84%	39.83%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	11.53%	20.92%	2.51%	34.96%
	<i>Other</i>	6.80%	9.28%	9.13%	25.21%
<i>Total</i>		42.74%	42.78%	14.48%	100.00%

Table S11.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in Germany. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for Germany. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,217.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	37.60%	14.64%	3.55%	55.79%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	8.81%	11.75%	1.91%	22.47%
	<i>Other</i>	7.13%	8.09%	6.52%	21.74%
<i>Total</i>		53.54%	34.48%	11.98%	100.00%

Table S12.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in Germany, Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for Germany. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,217.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	37.62%	14.61%	3.83%	56.07%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	8.84%	11.86%	1.85%	22.55%
	<i>Other</i>	7.13%	7.94%	6.31%	21.38%
<i>Total</i>		53.59%	34.42%	12.00%	100.00%

Table S13.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Pooled Results. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the pooled dataset (with weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (**p < .01, *p < .05, *p < .10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer	0.26*** (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
D-Other	0.36*** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)
A-Equalizer	0.02 (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)
A-Other	0.10* (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
Male	0.06* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.07 (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.04 (0.06)	0.22*** (0.06)
Age: 70+	-0.26*** (0.09)	0.24*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)
Employed	0.02 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)

Retired	0.10 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)
In Education	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.14 (0.09)
Ideology: Left	0.50*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)
Ideology: Right	-0.31*** (0.06)	-0.58*** (0.05)
Germany	0.58*** (0.04)	0.43*** (0.04)
Constant	3.28*** (0.08)	3.66*** (0.07)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.131	0.164

Table S14.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Pooled Results, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the pooled dataset (without weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (**p < .01, *p < .05, *p < .10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer	0.25*** (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
D-Other	0.34*** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)
A-Equalizer	0.03 (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)
A-Other	0.07 (0.06)	-0.10* (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Male	0.04 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.08 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.02 (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)
Age: 70+	-0.23*** (0.09)	0.25*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.05)
Employed	0.02 (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.04 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)
Retired	0.10 (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)
In Education	-0.23** (0.09)	-0.13 (0.08)

Ideology: Left	0.47*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)
Ideology: Right	-0.27*** (0.06)	-0.58*** (0.05)
Germany	0.59*** (0.04)	0.43*** (0.03)
Constant	3.29*** (0.07)	3.65*** (0.07)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.123	0.163

Table S15.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Pooled Results, Ideology Excluded. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the pooled dataset (with weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***p*<.01, ***p*<.05, **p*<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer	0.26*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
D-Other	0.37*** (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)
A-Equalizer	0.05 (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)
A-Other	0.08 (0.06)	-0.13** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.02 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
Male	0.03 (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.33*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.06 (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.04 (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)
Age: 70+	-0.28*** (0.09)	0.21*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.13** (0.05)
Employed	0.01 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.01	-0.06

	(0.08)	(0.08)
Retired	0.11*	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.06)
In Education	-0.17*	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)
Germany	0.63***	0.51***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	3.26***	3.57***
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Observations	4,933	4,933
R-squared	0.101	0.115

Table S16.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Pooled Results, Ideology Excluded, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the pooled dataset (without weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (**p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer	0.26*** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
D-Other	0.35*** (0.05)	-0.10** (0.05)
A-Equalizer	0.05 (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)
A-Other	0.06 (0.06)	-0.13** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.01 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Male	0.01 (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.35*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.07 (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.02 (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)
Age: 70+	-0.25*** (0.09)	0.23*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.05)
Employed	0.02 (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.05 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
Retired	0.11* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)
In Education	-0.21** (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)

Germany	0.64*** (0.04)	0.52*** (0.03)
Constant	3.28*** (0.07)	3.57*** (0.07)
Observations	4,933	4,933
R-squared	0.098	0.115

Table S17.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Country Results. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1 and 2) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 3 and 4) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the United States and Germany (with weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***) $p < .01$, (**) $p < .05$, (*) $p < .10$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor	Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
	United States	Germany	United States	Germany
D-Equalizer	0.31*** (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)
D-Other	0.46*** (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.18** (0.08)
A-Equalizer	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.23*** (0.06)
A-Other	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.15* (0.08)	0.01 (0.10)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Male	0.01 (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Income: Middle	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Income: High	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.31*** (0.08)	-0.39*** (0.07)	-0.17** (0.07)
Age: 30-49	0.10 (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)	0.09 (0.07)	0.29*** (0.09)
Age: 50-69	-0.14* (0.07)	0.16* (0.09)	0.16** (0.07)	0.33*** (0.09)
Age: 70+	-0.46*** (0.13)	0.16 (0.12)	0.15 (0.11)	0.41*** (0.12)
Education: Middle	-0.17*** (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Education: High	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.13** (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)
Employed	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.27*** (0.06)	-0.10 (0.10)
Unemployed	0.01	0.00	-0.12	0.08

	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Retired	0.08	0.11	-0.05	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)
In Education	-0.06	-0.20	-0.29**	0.17
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Ideology: Left	0.46***	0.51***	0.54***	0.27***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Ideology: Right	-0.43***	0.04	-0.70***	-0.12
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Constant	3.35***	3.77***	3.85***	3.72***
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Observations	2,733	2,188	2,733	2,188
R-squared	0.086	0.064	0.168	0.050

Table S18.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Country Results, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1 and 2) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 3 and 4) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the United States and Germany (without weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich United States	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich German	Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor United States	Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor Germany
D-Equalizer	0.32*** (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
D-Other	0.46*** (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.16** (0.07)
A-Equalizer	0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)
A-Other	0.05 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.13* (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.15*** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.10* (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.12** (0.06)
Male	-0.01 (0.05)	0.10** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)
Income: Middle	-0.10* (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Income: High	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.32*** (0.07)	-0.41*** (0.07)	-0.16** (0.07)
Age: 30-49	0.12* (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.07)	0.27*** (0.08)
Age: 50-69	-0.13* (0.07)	0.21** (0.08)	0.17** (0.07)	0.37*** (0.08)
Age: 70+	-0.45*** (0.12)	0.20* (0.11)	0.16 (0.11)	0.44*** (0.11)
Education: Middle	-0.16*** (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Education: High	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.13** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
Employed	0.07 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.12 (0.09)
Unemployed	0.06 (0.09)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.08)	0.11 (0.13)
Retired	0.06 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)
In Education	-0.14	-0.21	-0.29**	0.22*

	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Ideology: Left	0.44***	0.47***	0.50***	0.31***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Ideology: Right	-0.35***	0.01	-0.71***	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Constant	3.34***	3.82***	3.85***	3.70***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Observations	2,733	2,188	2,733	2,188
R-squared	0.077	0.061	0.168	0.053

Table S19.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Country Results, Ideology Excluded. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1 and 2) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 3 and 4) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the United States and Germany (with weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***) $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich		Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor	
	United States	Germany	United States	Germany
D-Equalizer	0.34*** (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
D-Other	0.47*** (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.18** (0.08)
A-Equalizer	0.07 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.24*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.06)
A-Other	0.04 (0.08)	0.08 (0.09)	-0.21*** (0.08)	0.00 (0.10)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Male	-0.04 (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Income: Middle	-0.12** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Income: High	-0.13* (0.08)	-0.32*** (0.08)	-0.44*** (0.07)	-0.18** (0.07)
Age: 30-49	0.09 (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)	0.30*** (0.08)
Age: 50-69	-0.15** (0.07)	0.17* (0.09)	0.16** (0.07)	0.35*** (0.09)
Age: 70+	-0.53*** (0.13)	0.19 (0.12)	0.06 (0.11)	0.44*** (0.12)
Education: Middle	-0.16*** (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Education: High	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.15** (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
Employed	0.05 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.28*** (0.06)	-0.09 (0.10)
Unemployed	0.03	0.02	-0.10	0.10

	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Retired	0.09	0.12	-0.05	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)
In Education	-0.03	-0.19	-0.23	0.20
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Constant	3.33***	3.82***	3.77***	3.72***
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Observations	2,740	2,193	2,740	2,193
R-squared	0.049	0.036	0.085	0.041

Table S20.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Country Results Without Ideology, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1 and 2) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 3 and 4) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the United States and Germany (without weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***) p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich		Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor	
	United States	Germany	United States	Germany
D-Equalizer	0.34*** (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
D-Other	0.47*** (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.15** (0.07)
A-Equalizer	0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)
A- Other	0.03 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.20** (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0.15*** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.11** (0.06)
Male	-0.04 (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)
Income: Middle	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Income: High	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.33*** (0.07)	-0.47*** (0.07)	-0.16** (0.07)
Age: 30-49	0.10 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)	0.29*** (0.08)
Age: 50-69	-0.15** (0.07)	0.22*** (0.08)	0.16** (0.07)	0.39*** (0.08)
Age: 70+	-0.51*** (0.13)	0.23** (0.12)	0.07 (0.11)	0.46*** (0.11)
Education: Middle	-0.16*** (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Education: High	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)
Employed	0.07 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.09)	-0.27*** (0.06)	-0.11 (0.09)
Unemployed	0.07 (0.09)	0.02 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.13 (0.13)
Retired	0.07 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.09)
In Education	-0.12	-0.19	-0.24*	0.25**

	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Constant	3.33***	3.85***	3.76***	3.70***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Observations	2,740	2,193	2,740	2,193
R-squared	0.049	0.036	0.088	0.041

Table S21.

Frequency of Redistribution Types Using Alternative Coding Rules. This table reports the distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) separately for the pooled dataset (second column), the United States (third column), and Germany (fourth column) using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N(total)=4,966. N(United States)=2,749, N(Germany)=2,217.

D-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer _{Alt}	51.28%	43.69%	60.70%
Non-Equalizer _{Alt}	26.47%	32.21%	19.35%
Other _{Alt}	22.24%	24.10%	19.94%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

A-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer _{Alt}	53.00%	47.17%	60.22%
Non-Equalizer _{Alt}	34.14%	38.85%	28.31%
Other _{Alt}	12.86%	13.98%	11.47%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table S22.

Frequency of Redistribution Types Using Alternative Coding Rules, Unweighted. This table reports the distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) separately for the pooled dataset (second column), the United States (third column), and Germany (fourth column) using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-0.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < 0.2$: Non-Equalizer, $0.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < 0.8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N(total)=4,966. N(United States)=2,749, N(Germany)=2,217.

D-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer _{Alt}	51.57%	43.72%	61.30%
Non-Equalizer _{Alt}	26.44%	32.12%	19.40%
Other _{Alt}	21.99%	24.15%	19.31%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

A-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer _{Alt}	53.06%	47.29%	60.22%
Non-Equalizer _{Alt}	34.07%	38.70%	28.33%
Other _{Alt}	12.87%	14.01%	11.46%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table S23.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample Using Alternative Coding Rules. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for the pooled dataset using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=4,966.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	35.44%	12.47%	3.37%	51.28%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	9.91%	14.72%	1.85%	26.47%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.65%	6.96%	7.64%	22.24%
<i>Total</i>		53.00%	34.14%	12.86%	100.00%

Table S24.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample Using Alternative Coding Rules, Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for the pooled dataset using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=4,966.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	35.40%	12.59%	3.58%	51.57%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	10.03%	14.62%	1.79%	26.44%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.63%	6.87%	7.49%	21.99%
<i>Total</i>		53.06%	34.07%	12.87%	100.00%

Table S25.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the United States Using Alternative Coding Rules. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for US respondents using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,749.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	28.40%	12.23%	3.06%	43.69%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	11.10%	19.03%	2.08%	32.21%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.67%	7.60%	8.83%	24.10%
<i>Total</i>		47.17%	38.85%	13.98%	100.00%

Table S26.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the United States Using Alternative Coding Rules, Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for US respondents using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,749.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	28.23%	12.26%	3.24%	43.72%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	11.28%	18.81%	2.04%	32.12%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.78%	7.64%	8.73%	24.15%
<i>Total</i>		47.29%	38.70%	14.01%	100.00%

Table S27.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in Germany Using Alternative Coding Rules. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for German respondents using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,217.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	44.18%	12.77%	3.76%	60.70%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	8.43%	9.37%	1.55%	19.35%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.61%	6.17%	6.16%	19.94%
<i>Total</i>		60.22%	28.31%	11.47%	100.00%

Table S28.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in Germany Using Alternative Coding Rules, Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for German respondents using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,217.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	44.29%	12.99%	4.01%	61.30%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	8.48%	9.43%	1.49%	19.40%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.44%	5.91%	5.95%	19.31%
<i>Total</i>		60.22%	28.33%	11.46%	100.00%

Table S29.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results Using Alternative Coding Rules for Classifying Redistribution Types. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the pooled dataset (with weights) using the alternative coding scheme. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (**p < .01, *p < .05, *p < .10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.26*** (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
D-Other _{Alt}	0.37*** (0.06)	-0.10* (0.05)
A-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.03 (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
A-Other _{Alt}	0.14** (0.06)	-0.14** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)
Male	0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.07 (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.04 (0.06)	0.22*** (0.06)
Age: 70+	-0.26*** (0.09)	0.24*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)
Employed	0.01 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)
Retired	0.10 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)
In Education	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.14 (0.09)

Ideology: Left	0.50*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.05)
Ideology: Right	-0.32*** (0.06)	-0.59*** (0.05)
Germany	0.58*** (0.04)	0.43*** (0.04)
Constant	3.27*** (0.08)	3.67*** (0.07)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.131	0.162

Table S30.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results Using Alternative Coding Rules, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the pooled dataset (without weights) using the alternative coding scheme. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***) $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$.

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.26*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
D-Other _{Alt}	0.35*** (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
A-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.03 (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
A-Other _{Alt}	0.11* (0.06)	-0.15** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.00 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Male	0.04 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.08 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.02 (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)
Age: 70+	-0.23*** (0.09)	0.25*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.05)
Employed	0.02 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.03 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)
Retired	0.10 (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)
In Education	-0.23**	-0.12

	(0.09)	(0.08)
Ideology: Left	0.47***	0.40***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ideology: Right	-0.27***	-0.58***
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Germany	0.59***	0.43***
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant	3.27***	3.66***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.123	0.163

Table S31.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results Using Alternative Coding Rules, Ideology Excluded. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the pooled dataset (with weights) using the alternative coding scheme. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.26*** (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
D-Other _{Alt}	0.38*** (0.06)	-0.08 (0.05)
A-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.06 (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)
A-Other _{Alt}	0.12* (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)
Male	0.03 (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.34*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.06 (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.04 (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)
Age: 70+	-0.28*** (0.09)	0.22*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)
Employed	0.01 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.01 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
Retired	0.12* (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)
In Education	-0.18* (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)

	(0.10)	(0.09)
Germany	0.64***	0.51***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	3.25***	3.57***
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Observations	4,933	4,933
R-squared	0.101	0.118

Table S32.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results Using Alternative Coding Rules, Ideology excluded, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the pooled dataset (without weights) using the alternative coding scheme. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.26*** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
D-Other _{Alt}	0.36*** (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
A-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.05 (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)
A-Other _{Alt}	0.09 (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Male	0.01 (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.35*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.07 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.02 (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)
Age: 70+	-0.25*** (0.09)	0.23*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.05)
Employed	0.02 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)
Retired	0.11* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)
In Education	-0.21**	-0.07

	(0.09)	(0.09)
Germany	0.64***	0.51***
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant	3.27***	3.57***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Observations	4,933	4,933
R-squared	0.099	0.114

Table S33.

Comparison of the Causal Effects of Inequality in the Give-or-Take Game by Question Order in the Validation Study (Amazon Mechanical Turk Sample). This table reports coefficients from a linear regression of the amount taken on indicator variables for the inequality treatments and an indicator variable (*Policy Views First*) that equals 1 for all individuals that first had to answer the policy views questions and 0 for respondents that first played the give-or-take game as well as interactions between the inequality treatment conditions and the *Policy Views First* indicator variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	DV: Amount Taken
<i>Disadvantageous Inequality</i>	19.53*** (2.26)
<i>Equality</i>	10.13*** (2.27)
<i>Advantageous Inequality</i>	-3.86** (1.89)
<i>Policy Views First</i>	-4.54* (2.73)
<i>Disadvantageous Inequality * Policy Views First</i>	3.22 (4.32)
<i>Equality * Policy Views First</i>	2.21 (4.12)
<i>Observations</i>	504
<i>R-squared</i>	0.284

Table S34.

Comparison of parties' vote-share weighted welfare policy ideal points in Germany and the United States, 2000-2013. Higher values indicate more support for welfare state expansion. Parties' welfare state position as reported in the Comparative Manifesto Project Database are weighted by the respective party's relative vote share in the corresponding election. For German parties the vote share is computed as the share of votes relative to the total votes for both the SPD and the CDU. For US parties, we use the parties' popular vote shares in presidential elections. SPD=Social Democratic Party, CDU=Christian Democratic Union. Data sources: https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/; https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/mp_v4; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_presidential_elections_by_popular_vote_margin; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_federal_election,_2013; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_federal_election,_2009; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_federal_election,_2005; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_federal_election,_2002.

Year (GE/US)	SPD	Democrats	Difference		Difference	
			SPD-Democrats	CDU	Republicans	CDU-Republicans
2013/2012	857	576	281	422	264	158
2009/2008	731	357	374	353	169	184
2005/2004	605	457	148	408	251	157
2002/2000	513	685	-171	390	286	105
Mean	677	519	158	393	242	151

Table S35.

Comparison of redistribution in Germany and the United States (2014). This table reports changes in the poverty rate and income inequality due to taxes and transfers in Germany and the United States.

	United States	Germany	Difference (US-GE)
<i>Poverty rate (poverty line 60%)</i>			
Before taxes and transfers	.32	.36	.04
After taxes and transfers (poverty line 60%)	.24	.16	.08
Reduction (difference before and after)	-.08	-.20	-.16
<i>Income inequality Gini coefficient</i>			
Before taxes and transfers	.51	.50	.01
After taxes and transfers	.39	.29	.10
Reduction (difference before and after)	-.12	-.21	-.09

Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD), <http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm>.

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